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Abstract. This paper argues that the high historical excess returns to equity are1 a result of a severe 
ex post bias over the period from 1915 to circa 1960 because inflation surprises during this period 
drove a wedge between ex ante and ex post returns to bonds. Furthermore, it is shown that ex ante 
and ex post returns to shares are identical in steady state. Adjusting the ex post equity premium by 
the ex post bias reduces the equity premium to an arithmetic mean of 3.5-3.9% over the past 130 
years. 
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1 Introduction 
A question that has long puzzled financial economists is why the ex post equity premium has been 
substantially higher than the equity premium predicted by standard neoclassical consumer theory 
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985, 2003). Several theoretical studies have assumed that the ex ante and ex 
post equity premium are approximately of equal size and tried to solve the puzzle by modifications 
of the pricing kernel or by using prospect theory (see Mehra and Prescott, 2003, and Barberis et al., 
2001).  
Fama and French (2002) and Blanchard (1993), by contrast, argue that the ex post 
premium in the post-war period, in particular, has been driven up by a significant ex post bias. They 
find that a significant fraction of the ex post share returns has been unexpected and, therefore, that 
the dimension of the equity puzzle is either reduced or eliminated once the ex post bias is corrected 
for. Fama and French (2002) argue that an unexpected reduction in the required share returns has 
resulted in a positive ex post bias in the post-war period. Correcting for the bias they find ex ante 
equity premiums of 2.6% and 4.3% over the period from 1951 to 2000. Blanchard (1993) argues 
that a combination of unexpected high returns to shares and unexpected low returns to bonds 
resulted in an ex post bias.  
                                                 
1 Helpful ccomments and suggestions from participants at seminars at University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen Business 
School and Aarhus Business School are gratefully acknowledged. A grant from EPRU is also gratefully acknowledged. 
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 This paper argues that a significant ex post bias prevailed over the period from 1915 to 
circa 1960 due to unexpected low returns on bonds. It is shown that inflation was difficult to predict 
in the gold standard period and investors were slow to learn the inflationary consequences of the 
paper money regime after the abandonment of the gold standard in the beginning of the 1930s.2 
Quantitative, historical and inflation survey evidence suggests that inflation expectations were close 
to zero over the period from 1915 to circa 1960 and, therefore, that the inflation in this period was 
unexpected. The unanticipated inflationary shocks drove a wedge between ex post real share returns 
and ex post real bond returns, and the ex post equity premium consequently increased without 
affecting the ex ante equity premium. 
 The question is whether it is sufficient to adjust for an ex post bias in the bond market 
and, therefore, assume that ex post and ex ante equity returns are approximately equal. This paper 
argues that they are. Based on a general equilibrium model it is shown that the ex ante and the ex 
post real share returns are identical in steady state and, therefore, that ex post and ex ante returns 
only deviate outside steady states. It is shown that technology shocks, shifts in the required returns 
to equity and changes in corporate taxes have no long-run effects on real share prices because of 
endogenous adjustment of capital that certifies that the earnings per unit of capital will always tend 
toward the required returns to equity. An ex post bias, therefore, must have its genesis in the bond 
market when the capital stock is adjusted towards its desired level. 
 Data for a panel of 10 industrialised countries over the period from 1870 to 2002 are 
used to identify the ex post bias. The empirical estimates show that the ex post equity premium is 
significantly positively related to the realised rate of inflation on an almost one-to-one basis over 
the period from 1915 to 1960, after which time, inflation ceases to be an important determinant of 
the equity premium. Correcting the ex post equity premium by the inflation-induced bias reduces 
the historical equity premium in the OECD countries by approximately 3-percentage points to 3.5-
3.9% over the past 100-130 years, which is significantly below the ex post equity premium. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents informal evidence on the 
relationship between bond returns and inflation. Using historical, survey, and quantitative evidence 
Section 3 shows that inflation expectations were close to zero over the period from 1915 to circa 
1960. The empirical Sections 4 and 5 estimate the ex post bias for 10 OECD countries and in 
Section 6 it is shown that the ex post and ex ante real returns to shares are identical in steady state. 
                                                 
2 A similar argument has been put forward by Siegel. Siegel argues that “it is clear that the buyers of long-term bonds in 
the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s did not recognise the inflationary consequences of the change in monetary regime” 
(2002, p 17). 
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2 Ex post equity premium in the industrialised countries 
To get an impression of the time-profile of the ex post equity premium consider Figure 1, which 
displays an weighted nine-year centred moving average of the equity premium for Canada, the US, 
the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, Spain, the Netherlands, and Ireland, where the 
purchasing power parity real GDP is used as moving weights over the whole period. The 
hyperinflation period 1922-1924 is omitted for Germany and the civil war period 1936-1940 is 
omitted for Spain throughout the paper. Data definitions and data sources are relegated to the Data 
Appendix. 
 
Figure 1. Ex Post  Equity Premium, OECD
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Notes: Weighted centred nine-year moving average for Canada (1901), the US (1871), UK (1871), Australia (1885), 
Italy (1900), France (1871), Ireland (1871), Germany (1871), the Netherlands (1901), and Spain (1900), where the 
numbers in parentheses indicate starting year. Purchasing power parity moving GDP weights are used. The equity 
premium is calculated as the percentage change in the nominal accumulated share index minus the nominal interest rate 
on long government bonds. 
 
The arithmetic average of the ex post equity premium over the entire period is 5.56%, which is in 
line with most other estimates in the literature (Mehra and Prescott, 1985, 2003, Fama and French, 
2002, Dimeson et al., 2004).3,4 The equity premium was remarkably high over the period from 1915 
to 1960, namely 9.30%, which is 5.73-percentage points higher than the surrounding periods where 
it was 3.57% (1871-1914 and 1961-2002). This suggests that the height of the ex post equity 
                                                 
3 Throughout the paper the arithmetic mean is used. See Mehra and Prescott (2003) for a discussion of the relative 
merits of using arithmetic and geometric means. 
4 Jorian and Goitzman (1999) find a lower equity premium for non-US countries; however, their estimates do not 
include dividends, which have historically exceeded capital gains for the ten countries considered in this paper.  
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premium over the past 132 years has been heavily influenced by the equity premium in the 1915-
1960 period.  
 The next question is whether the equity premium in the 1915-1960 period has been a 
result of high ex post real share returns or low real interest rates. The ex post real returns on long 
bonds/shares were, on average, 4.00/7.57 over the periods from 1871 to 1914 and from 1961 to 
2002, but -1.10/10.40% over the period from 1915 to 1960, where the figures refer to weighted 
averages for the countries and periods covered in Figure 1. Over the whole period from 1871 to 
2002 the real ex post return to long bonds was 1.62, whereas the number was 7.18 for shares. This 
suggests that the ex post equity premium was high in the 1915-1960 period predominantly due to 
lower returns to the default free asset rather than higher returns to equity; a conclusion that is also 
reached by Mehra and Prescott (2003). These considerations suggest that the source of the high ex 
post equity premium in the 1915-1960 period must predominantly lie with the ex post real interest 
rate. 
 
Figure 2. Ex Post Real Interest Rate and Inflation
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Notes. See Notes to Figure 1. The ex post interest rate is the interest rate on a long government bond minus the rate of 
consumer price inflation.  
 
To get an impression of the influence of inflation on real bond returns, Figure 2 displays the ex post 
real interest rate on a long government bond and the ex post rate of consumer price inflation. The 
figure shows that the real interest rate is a mirror image of the inflation rate prior to 1960. The high 
inflations associated with the world wars resulted in significantly negative real interest rates. After 
1960, however, the nexus between the ex post real interest rate and inflation that prevailed prior to 
1960, almost disappears because investors started to understand the inflationary bias associated with 
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the paper money regime that was introduced after the break-down of the gold standard in the 
1930s.5  
In the post-1960 period it appears that ex post real interest rates have only been 
influenced by changing inflation; probably because the inflation changes have been unexpected. 
However, this has not significantly affected the ex post equity premium because share returns have 
been equally adversely affected by changes in inflation, as discussed in the next section. 
The long bond rate is used in the calculations of the equity premium here following 
most of the empirical literature on the equity premium. Since the short interest rate is closer to being 
a risk-free asset than the long interest rate, it should be the alternative asset on which the equity 
premium should be based. However, the empirical estimates in Section 4 show that the ex post bias 
is slightly higher if the short bond rate is used instead of a long bond. Thus, the results in this 
section are slightly strengthened if a short interest rate is used. 
 Overall the informal evidence in this section suggests that the ex post real interest rate 
prior to 1960 was driven predominantly by realised inflation because it was unexpected. The 
outbreak of the worldwide inflation during WWI was associated with the abandonment of the gold 
standard in Europe in 1914 and a sharp reduction in the gold-backup ratio in the US; thus violating 
the gold standard rule of constant gold back-up ratios that prevailed before 1914 (Eichengreen, 
1992). Since the resulting surge in the money supply during WWI and shortly thereafter was 
unanticipated, bond owners suffered large real capital losses during this period. Similarly the 
inflationary consequences of WW2 took bond investors by surprise as argued in the next section 
and shown formally in the empirical section (Section 4). 
 
3 Inflation and ex post returns to equity and bonds  
Whereas bond yields are significantly adversely affected by unexpected inflation share returns are 
not. Yields on bonds at the date of issue, are, to a large extent, determined by inflation expectations 
over the life span of the bond. Inflation surprises consequently lower the ex post real returns on 
bonds. Shares, by contrast, are hedged against inflation surprises provided that relative prices such 
as real wages, taxes, and real interests on debt are neutral to inflation. Numerous studies have 
shown that real wages are only temporarily affected by inflation surprises following the natural rate 
hypothesis (see for instance Madsen, 1998).  
                                                 
5 Most countries went off gold in the first years of the 1930s whereas the Gold Block countries consisting of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Poland, Switzerland and Italy, first abandoned gold in 1935 and 1936 (see Table 7.1 in 
Eichengreen, 1992). 
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Taxes, however, are not neutral to inflation because depreciation for tax purposes are 
at historical cost (Feldstein, 1980). Furthermore, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argued that ex post 
share returns are adversely affected by changes in inflation because share investors suffer from 
inflation illusion. Despite adverse effects on share returns of unexpected changes in inflation being 
muted by tax-deductions of interest expenses on debt, and that ex post real interest rates tend to 
decrease in inflationary periods, the real ex post share returns are significantly negatively affected 
by increasing inflation (Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004). However, as shown in Section 4, the ex 
post equity premium was unaffected by the increasing inflation in the 1970s because the nominal 
interest rates were slow to adjust to the increasing inflation; thus counterbalancing the adverse 
inflationary effects on ex post share returns. Furthermore, the endogenous response in the capital 
stock to the depressed share market in the 1970s drove earnings per unit of capital up as shown 
formally in the general equilibrium model in Section 6, which rendered the adverse earnings-effects 
from inflation temporary.  
 The next question is the extent to which the pre-1960 and the post-1960 inflations 
were expected and, therefore, the prevalence of an ex post bias in real bond returns in these two 
periods. A necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for inflation to be embodied in bond prices is 
that inflation can be predicted. The econometric evidence of Barsky (1987) gives strong support to 
the hypothesis that inflation prior to 1960 could not have been predicted in the US and the UK due 
to low inflation persistence. Barsky (1987) shows that nominal interest rates and realised inflation 
rates were uncorrelated prior to 1960 but strongly correlated thereafter. The question is whether 
Barsky’s (1987) finding, based on year-to-year evidence, carries over on a longer term basis 
corresponding to the life of a medium and a long-term term bond under various monetary regimes. 
In other words, could long-term inflation have been predicted before and after 1960? 
 
Table 1. Five-year inflation forecasts. 
Est. Period  Lagged Inflation Growth in Oil Prices Growth in M1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1893-1960  -0.04(0.68)  0.00(0.53)  -0.02(0.49) 
1933-1960  -0.13(1.57)  -0.09(3.55)   0.14(1.91) 
1963-2002   0.13(2.44)  0.01(1.18)   0.08(3.60) 
Notes: The estimates are the sum of the lagged coefficient estimates and the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-
statistics. All variables are measured in decimal points. Eight annual lags of all the regressors are included in the 
estimates. The country sample is Canada, the US, UK, Australia, Italy, France, Ireland, Germany, Spain and the 
Netherlands in the post 1960 estimates. The same countries except Ireland and Germany, are included in the pre 1960 
estimates. 
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To investigate this issue five-year consumer price inflation forecasts are reported in Table 1 for the 
pre 1960 and the post 1960 periods and over the period from 1933 to 1960. The average rate of 
inflation over the subsequent five years is regressed on eight-year lags of inflation, the growth in oil 
prices, and the growth in M1. This approach is similar to the approach used by Blanchard (1993). 
The data are pooled using the SUR estimator, which is discussed in detail in the empirical section. 
The ten countries considered in Figures 1 and 2 are included in the data set except Ireland and 
Germany for the pre 1960 estimates because M1 is not available over the whole estimation period 
for these two countries. The sum of the lagged coefficient estimates and their attached t-statistics 
are reported in the table. The post-1960 estimates commence in 1963 because M1 is not available 
before 1949 for Germany. 
The estimation results suggest that Barsky’s (1987) findings extend to five-year 
inflation forecasts. Over the period from 1893 to 1960 long term inflation was unrelated to lagged 
inflation and lagged growth in M1 and oil prices. The results remain almost unaltered if the 
estimation period is narrowed down to the 1933-1960 period. In the post 1963 period, by contrast, 
the estimates indicate that inflation is, to some extent, predictable. The estimated coefficients of 
past inflations and past growth rates in money supply are significant at conventional significance 
levels. Thus, at least some of the inflation could have been predicted in the post 1960 period, 
whereas inflation could not have been predicted prior to 1960 based on information economists 
have traditionally highlighted as important for predicting inflation. 
This evidence and the findings by Barsky (1987) are supported by survey inflation 
expectations. Unfortunately, survey data on inflation expectations were first made available from 
1946 in the US by Livingston and much later in other countries. Inflation expectations prior to 1946 
are discussed below. In the Livingston survey business people and academics are asked about 
expected inflation over the next 12 months.6 The average expected inflation is displayed together 
with the realised one-year growth in consumer prices in Figure 3. The survey expectations are 
forwarded 12 months. 
The figure indicates large discrepancies between expected and realised inflation prior 
to circa 1960. In fact, inflation expectations were negative over the period from 1946 until 1950 
despite high inflation in the same period, which suggests that the immediate post-war inflation was 
not expected. Clearly the respondents were, at that time, not familiar with the inflationary 
                                                 
6 The survey data are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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consequences of the post-gold-standard monetary regime and were perhaps expecting deflation in 
the first years after WWII based on their experience from the post WWI deflation in 1921 and 1922. 
 
Figure 3. US Inflation
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Notes. The realised consumer price inflation is forwarded 12 months. Realised and expected inflation are on annual 
basis. Expected inflation is from the Livingston Surveys. 
 
After 1960, however, the figure indicates that actual and expected inflation coincide. These 
observations are consistent with results from empirical analyses in Section 4. Inflation expectations 
were unbiased predictors of inflation in the post-1960 period but not before then.7 Furthermore, the 
estimated coefficient of expected inflation is not significantly different from zero before 1960, 
which suggests that the pre-1960 inflation was unexpected. 
 Turning to the question of inflation expectations prior to 1946, the historical evidence 
suggests that price changes were not predicted. McGrattan and Prescott (2003), for instance, argue 
that the expected rate of inflation was zero in the gold standard period. In the most careful study of 
inflation expectations in the US over the period from 1870 to 1914, Barsky and De Long (1991) 
argue that the deflation from 1879 to 1896 and the inflation from 1896 to 1913 were never built into 
                                                 
7 Regressing realised inflation on 12-month lagged inflation expectations yields an estimated coefficient of expected 
inflation of -0.361(0.4) over the estimation period from 1947 to 1960, and an estimated coefficient of expected inflation 
of 0.995(9.03) over the estimation period from 1961-2003, where the numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. 
Wald tests of the hypothesis of unity coefficient of inflation expectations are  = 3.36 for the 1947-1960 period and 
 = 0.00 for the 1961-2003 period. The standard errors are based on the Newey-West heteroscedastic consistent 
and first-order serial correlation consistent covariance matrix. 
2 (1)χ
2 (1)χ
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inflation expectations in the US. Their time-series evidence based on ARIMA models suggests that 
univariate models could not predict inflation.8 Although they find world gold production to be a 
statistically significant predictor of prices, they argue that the 1995-1914 gold boom was never 
build into inflation expectations based on studies of the quantity-theoretical-leaning Economist.  
 Using the model of Barsky and De Long (1991), the price changes in the period from 
1914 to the Great Depression could not have been predicted. World gold production increased 
gradually by 2.2% annually on average over the period from 1914 to 1931 (Table 11 in Warren and 
Pearson, 1932), which is close to the growth in real world GDP over the same period. It is, 
therefore, unlikely that inflation expectations were significantly different from zero before the gold 
standard was abandoned in the beginning of the 1930s.  
 
4 Empirical estimates 
This section tests the implications of the hypothesis forwarded in this paper, namely, 1) that 
nominal interest rates were insensitive to ex post inflation prior to 1960; 2) that nominal share 
returns were positively related to inflation prior to 1960; and, therefore, 3) that the ex post equity 
premium is positively related to ex post inflation prior to 1960, but not thereafter. 
 To test these hypotheses the following three models are estimated using pooled cross 
section and time-series analysis: 
 
1915 1960 2002
0 1 2 3 1,it it it it itep a a a aπ π π= + + + +ε ,    (1) 
1915 1960 2002
0 1 2 3 2,it it it it iti b b b bπ π π= + + + +ε     (2) 
1915 1960 2002
0 1 2 3 3,it it it it iter c c c cπ π π= + + + +ε     (3) 
 
where ep is the ex post equity premium measured in percentage points as ex post share returns 
minus the nominal interest rate on a long government bond, i is the nominal interest rate on long-
term government bonds in percentage points, er is nominal equity returns in percentage points, ε  is 
a disturbance term and 1915π , 1960π , and  are inflation rates in percentage points prior to 1915, 
between 1915 and 1960, and between 1961 and 2002, respectively, and zero elsewhere. Four-year 
lags of all the regressors are included in the estimates to allow for slow adjustment of asset returns 
to innovations in inflation.  
2002π
                                                 
8 Perez and Siegler (2003) argue that changes in prices are not white noise prior to 1913 for the US and find that the 
serial correlation coefficient of price changes to be approximately 0.3, which suggests that some of the short-term 
deflation and inflation could have been predicted. However, no evidence showing that the predictive element of 
inflation was built into inflation expectations, is provided. 
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The models are estimated using annual data over the period from 1871 to 2002 for 
five countries (group A) and over the period from 1900 to 2002 for ten countries (group B) as 
dictated by data availability. Group A consists of the US, the UK, Ireland, France, and Germany. 
The following additional five countries are included in group B: Canada, Australia, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. Country-dummies were excluded from the estimates because their 
estimated coefficients were both individually and jointly insignificant at conventional levels, which 
suggests that the ex post equity premium is not significantly different across countries when the 
influence of inflation on the equity premium, share returns and bond returns is allowed for. Impulse 
dummies are included for Germany over the period from 1922 to 1926 to avoid the influence on the 
parameter estimates of the hyperinflation, and for Spain over the civil war period from 1936 to 
1940.  
 To gain efficiency the model is estimated allowing for the correlation of the error-
terms between countries. The covariance matrix is weighted by the correlation of the disturbance 
terms using the following variance-covariance structure: 
 
E{ }   = ,    i = 1, 2,... N, 2itε 2iσ
E{εit,εjt} = σij,    i ≠ j, 
 
where  = the variance of the disturbance terms for country i = 1, 2,... N, σ2iσ ij = the covariance of 
the disturbance terms across countries i and j; and ε is the disturbance term. The variance  is 
assumed to be constant over time but to vary across countries and the error terms are assumed to be 
mutually correlated across countries, σ
2
iσ
ij, as random shocks are likely to impact on all countries at 
the same time. The terms  and σ2iσ ij, are estimated using the feasible generalized least squares 
method. 
 The results of estimating Equations (1)-(3) are reported in Table 2. The reported 
coefficient estimates are the sum of all lags. R2 is not reported since it is driven to one by the 
German hyperinflation dummies. The null hypothesis of cross-country coefficient homogeneity 
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels for any of the estimates. Nor do the tests for 
first-order serial correlation and ARCH effects give evidence against the model specification. These 
results indicate that the models are well specified. 
 The estimates of the ex post equity premium in columns 1 and 2 are the key estimates 
in this paper. The estimated coefficients of inflation over the period from 1915 to 1960 are 
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statistically highly significant. The coefficient estimates are 0.70 for group A and 0.62 for group B, 
which indicate that inflation was highly influential for the ex post equity premium over this period. 
In the post-1960 period, however, the estimated coefficients of inflation are statistically 
insignificant at any conventional levels; thus, inflation ceases to affect the ex post equity premium 
past 1960. These results are consistent with the evidence in the previous section and the findings of 
Barsky (1987). Prior to 1915, the estimated coefficients of inflation are also insignificant, which is 
not surprising given inflation fluctuated very little and were, on average, close to zero in this period. 
Hence, little identifying variations in price changes was present in that period. 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates of Equations (1)-(3). 
    Equity Premium        Bond Yields      Share Returns 
      A      B      A      B      A      B     
 ----------------------------- ----------------------------- ----------------------------- 
1915
tπ  -2.57(1.33)  0.36(0.26)  0.03(0.37) -0.06(0.54) -2.01(1.65)  0.36(0.28) 
1960
tπ   0.70(4.98)  0.62(6.46)  0.02(2.34)  0.00(0.78)  0.49(4.02)  0.38(4.68) 
2002
tπ   0.61(1.41)  0.11(0.38)  0.63(10.42)  0.78(17.4)  0.97(3.35)  0.47(2.22) 
Con.  3.42(2.45)  3.67(3.17)  3.99(20.9)  4.48(19.1)  6.10(4.84)  7.05(5.43) 
 
Est. Per.  1878-2002  1907-2002  1878-2002  1907-2002  1878-2002  1907-2002 
TN ⋅   625   960  625   960  625   960  
DW(m)  1.98  1.97  1.98  2.00  1.98  1.93  
F(i,j)  0.93  1.45  0.93  1.45  1.55  1.22  
ARCH  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.27  
Notes: The coefficient estimates are the sum of all lags. Absolute t-statistics are given in parentheses.  = number 
of observations, where N is the number of countries, T is the time-period. DW(m) = modified Durbin-Watson test for 
first order serial correlation in fixed effect panel data models (see Bhargava et al., 1982). F(i,j) = F-test for cross-
country coefficient constancy, and is distributed as F(N(k-1),NT-Nk) under the null hypothesis of coefficient constancy, 
and k is the number of regressors (19). ARCH = fixed effect model ARCH test, based on within individual residuals, and 
is distributed as  under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. The following 5 countries are included in group 
A: The US, the UK, Ireland, France, and Germany. The following 10 countries are included in group B: The US, the 
UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Impulse dummies are included in 
the estimates over the period from 1922 to 1926 for Germany, and over the period from 1936 to 1940 for Spain. 
TN ⋅
)1(2χ
 
Turning to nominal bond returns, columns 3 and 4 the estimated coefficients of inflation show that 
inflation was not embodied in nominal bond returns before 1960. This reflects either that inflation 
was not adequately embodied into bond prices or that inflation could not have been predicted. After 
1960 the estimated coefficients of inflation become statistically highly significant. The estimated 
coefficients of inflation post 1960 are 0.63 (group A) and 0.78 (group B) and bonds, consequently, 
start to become fractionally hedged against inflation.  
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 The estimates of the share return equation in columns 5 and 6 in Table 2 show that 
nominal share returns since 1915 have been significantly positively related to inflation. That the 
estimated coefficients of inflation are less than one is either because share prices are slow to adjust 
to innovations in inflation when it is unexpected or because inflation is positively correlated with 
omitted variables that adversely affect share returns. Madsen (2005), for instance, shows that 
inflationary periods are often associated with gains in labour’s income shares in total income and 
that the null hypothesis of a unity coefficient of inflation cannot be rejected when supply shocks or 
labour’s income share are accommodated in the estimates. 
 Finally, as noted in Section 2, the short-term interest rate may be a better reference 
rate than the long bond rate. However, estimates suggest that the ex post bias is slightly higher if the 
short interest rate is used. Basing the ex post equity premium on the short rate yields, in the 
estimates of Equation (1), an estimated coefficient on inflation of 0.74(5.24) for group A and 
0.63(6.42) for group B over the period from 1915 to 1960, where the numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. Thus, regardless of whether a short or a long bond rate is used in the estimates, inflation 
remains influential for the equity premium over the period from 1915 to 1960. 
 
5 Estimates of the ex post bias  
The estimates of Equation (1) can be used to recover the equity premium for all countries and the 
countries individually. For all countries the bias-corrected equity premium is reflected in the 
estimated constant terms in the first two columns in Table 2. The estimated constant terms are 3.4% 
over the period from 1878 to 2002 (group A) and 3.7% over the period from 1907 to 2002 (group 
B). The estimated constant term for group A increases to 3.9% if the estimation period commences 
in 1907. Given that the average ex post return for group A over the period from 1878 to 2002 is 
6.4%, the ex post bias is 3.0%. The ex post returns are also 6.4% for group B over the period from 
1907 to 2002, which entail an ex post bias of 2.7%. Thus, the inflation-correction has reduced the ex 
post equity premium to almost half its size.  
Turning to individual countries, Table 3 shows that the ex post equity premia varies 
substantially across countries from a high of 17.7% for Italy to a low of 2.3% for Spain over the 
period from 1915 to 1960. Although Japan has not been included in any of the estimates in the 
previous sections due to lack of data prior to 1914, it is included in Table 3 because the Japanese 
share market has always attracted much attention in the literature. The ex post equity premium was 
particularly high for four the countries that experienced the highest inflation over the period from 
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1915 to 1960, namely Japan (14.8%), Germany (12.5), France (12.7), and Italy (17.7), where the 
numbers in parentheses are ex post share returns. Inflation-correcting the equity premium by 
subtracting from the ex post equity premium the average rate of inflation over the period from 1915 
to 1960 multiplied by the estimated coefficient of inflation for group B, reduces the cross-country 
variation in the equity premium substantially. The bias-correction results in a reduction in the equity 
premium from 14.8% to 9.8% for Japan, from 12.5% to 6.5% for Germany, from 12.7% to 4.5% for 
France, and from 17.7% to 7.5% for Italy. These bias-corrected values are much more plausible 
than the ex post values. 
 
Table 3. Inflation-corrected equity premium, 1915-1960. 
Country EPEx Post Inflation EPC Country EPEx Post Inflation EPC
---------------------------------------------------- Percent --------------------------------------------------------- 
USA 9.1 2.6 7.4 Canada 6.7 2.3 5.3 
UK 5.1 2.9 3.3 Australia 7.4 3.4 5.3 
Ireland 6.8 4.3 4.1 Italy 17.7 16.4 7.5 
France 12.7 13.9 4.5 Netherlands 5.8 3.1 3.9 
Germany 12.5  9.7 6.5 Spain 2.3 6.6 -1.8 
Japan 14.8 8.0  9.8 Average 9.4 6.7 4.6 
Notes. The coefficient of 0.62 is used in the corrections. EPEx post is the ex post equity premium, EPC is the inflation-
corrected equity premium. The average is unweighted. 
 
6 Are the ex post share returns an unbiased estimator for ex ante share returns? 
Above it has been implicitly assumed that the ex post share returns are approximately equal to ex 
ante share returns. This assumption stands in contrast to the Fama and French (2002) analysis, 
which shows that the ex post equity premium over the period from 1951 to 2000 was extraordinary 
high because declining required returns resulted in large unexpected capital gains. The Fama-
French model is based on Gordon’s growth model. A problem associated with Gordon’s growth 
model, however, is that all variables in this model are endogenous and, therefore, cannot be 
assumed to be exogenous over half a century. A change in the required share returns or earnings per 
unit of capital will trigger an endogenous response in investment, particularly, and consumption, 
which render their effects on share prices only short-lived, as shown below.  
 To show that ex ante and ex post share returns are identical in the steady a standard 
general equilibrium model is established. The model is used to show that earnings per share echo 
required returns to equity and that share prices are unaffected by shocks to earnings in steady state. 
The model consists of firms and consumers. 
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Firms. Investment and share prices are determined jointly from the following optimization problem 
of the representative firm, where the discount rate is taken as given: 
 
  0
0
max (1 ){ ( , , ) ( )}vv
r dv
t t t t t t tt
e F z L K LW Iτ φ
∞
=
∞ −
=
∫ ⎡ ⎤Π = − − − −⎣ ⎦∫ I dt
 
st. 
 ttt KIK )1(1 δ−+=+ , 
 
where  is real profits, K is capital stock, I is net investment, W is the wage rate, L is labour 
services, r is the required returns to equity, 
Π
( )tIφ is the adjustment cost of investment, '( ) 0tIφ > , 
''( ) 0tIφ > , δ is the rate of capital depreciation, τ is the corporate tax rate, and z is a technology 
parameter. Furthermore, , , , and ' 0KF > '' 0KF < ' 0zF > '' 0zF < . The firm is an all equity firm and all 
earnings are paid out. 
 Solving this optimization problem yields the following first order conditions for 
optimum under the assumption of perfect competition: 
 
 ,(1 ) ( )K t t t tMP r q qτ δ− = + &−
t
,    (4) 
 1 '( )(1 )tI qφ τ+ − = ,     (5) 
 
where q is the shadow price of capital or Tobin’s q, τ  is the corporate tax rate, and a dot over a 
variable signifies first differences. The transversality condition is assumed to be satisfied and not 
displayed among the first order conditions to preserve space. Equation (4) is the asset market 
equilibrium condition and Equation (5) is the equilibrium condition in the market for fixed 
investment. For a given required returns to equity and employment, Equations (4) and (5) determine 
share prices and capital stock. Furthermore, after-tax earnings per unit of capital after depreciation 
are equal to the required returns in steady state. 
 
Consumers. The representative consumer has preferences ordered by: 
 
 
1
0
1
1
tt
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θ
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subject to the budget constraint 
 
 , t t t t ta W L r a C= + −& t
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where U is utility, a is per capita assets, r is the expected returns to equity, ρ  is a subjective 
discount factor, θ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and C is consumption.  
 A necessary and a sufficient condition for an interior solution is given by: 
 
 1 (C r
C
)ρθ= −
&
.     (6) 
 
General equilibrium. Setting the depreciation rate equal to zero without affecting the results, the 
condition for equilibrium in the goods markets is given by: 
 
 ( , ) ( )t t t t tF K L C I Iφ= + + .     (7) 
 
Solving out consumption from Equation (6) using Equation (7), we arrive at the following 
simultaneous first-order differential equation system with the (K, q, r)-vector of endogenous 
variables:  
 
 ,(1 )t t t Kq r q MP tτ= − −&      (8) 
 [( 1) /(1 )]t tK h q τ= − −& ,     (9) 
 [ ] [ ]( )( ( , ) ( 1) /(1 ) ( ( 1) /(1 ) )) /t t t tC r F z K h q h qρ τ φ τ= − − − − − − −& θ
                                                
,  (10) 
 
where labour is normalised to one following Abel and Blanchard (1983). The model can easily be 
extended to allow for endogenous labour supply as shown by Kiley (2005); however, this extension 
does not influence the steady-state properties of the model. 
The equation system (8)-(10) can be used to show that ex post and ex ante share 
returns are identical in steady state. To show this it needs to be shown that 1) capital gains from any 
exogenous shock are zero in steady state; and that 2) after-tax dividends or after-tax earnings per 
unit of capital are equal to the required returns to equity in steady state. Note from Equation (10) 
that changes in the required share returns are identical to changes in the subjective discount factor. 
That capital gains are independent of any exogenous shock in the steady state can be 
validated from the following steady-state multipliers:9
 
 
9 Summers (1981) shows that share prices in steady state are affected by changing depreciation rules because they 
change the effective acquision cost of capital. However, the shares referred to in Summers’ analysis are shares of 
establised firms undertaking no investment. However, share prices of firms for which the whole capital stock has been 
generated under the new depreciation rules, are unaffected by changes in depreciation rules in the steady state. 
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 0q q q
zρ τ
∂ ∂ ∂= = =∂ ∂ ∂ .     (11) 
 
That after-tax earnings per unit of capital change proportionally with the discount factor follows 
from the following steady state multiplier: 
 
 [ ](1 ) 1KMP τρ
∂ − =∂ .     (12) 
 
The intuition behind these results is that, due to convex adjustment costs in investment, a reduction 
in the subjective discount factor, for instance, increases share prices and Tobin’s q above their long-
run equilibriums. Tobin’s q in excess of one initiate a capital deepening process, which reduces 
earnings per unit of capital, due to the assumption of diminishing returns to capital. The capital 
deepening continues until after-tax earnings per unit of capital have changed proportionally to the 
subjective discount factor as indicated by Equation (12). Tobin’s q has returned to its initial level 
after the capital stock has adjusted to its new equilibrium; thus capital gains on shares are zero in 
the long run as established by Equation (11). Similarly, a technology shock that increases earnings 
per unit of capital leads to higher share prices and Tobin’s q; thus triggering a capital deepening 
process until earnings per unit of capital, and hence, share prices are back to their initial 
equilibrium. 
 Thus, the problem associated with the conventional analysis of the effects on ex post 
share returns of changing required returns based on Gordon’s growth model is that the exogeneity 
assumptions are violated. A reduction in the required share returns leads simultaneously to 1) higher 
share prices because future earnings are discounted at a lower rate; and 2) a capital-deepening 
process because the marginal product of additional capital stock net of depreciation exceeds the cost 
of capital, which is reflected in the required returns to equity. Investment in new fixed capital 
terminates when the after-tax marginal product of capital net of depreciation reaches the new and 
lower required returns to equity. In terms of Gordon’s growth model the initial decrease in the 
required returns results initially in increasing share prices, but a subsequent decline in share prices 
until their initial level is reached because the numerator always changes by the same proportion as 
the denominator in steady state equilibrium. Thus the capital gains are only temporary. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
The seminal paper by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and the subsequent research on the equity 
premium puzzle has been motivated by a historical equity premium of approximately 6%. This 
paper has argued that the equity puzzle is not nearly as large as suggested by historical estimates 
because inflation over the period from 1915 to 1960 was unexpected and, therefore, resulted in 
unexpected capital losses on bonds. The estimates showed that the ex post equity premium was 
significantly positively affected by inflation over the period from 1915 to 1960 and that the 
inflation-induced ex post bias was, on average, 3-percentage points over the period from 1878 to 
2002 for the major industrialised countries. Thus, half of the ex post equity premium has been 
inflation-induced, on average, for the countries considered in this paper. Furthermore, it was shown 
that the large cross-country discrepancies in the ex post equity premium over the period from 1915 
to 1960 were inflation-induced; thus explaining why the ex post equity premia were two digit 
numbers in Japan, France, Germany, and Italy, but single digit numbers in other industrialised 
countries, over the period from 1915 to 1960.  
 The possibility that the ex post equity premium has been further biased by an 
unexpected reduction in the required returns to equity was ruled out. Using a general equilibrium 
model it was shown that ex post and ex ante share returns are identical in the steady state because 
earnings per unit of capital echo the required returns to shares and because real share prices will 
always return to a constant mean in the long provided that all earnings are paid out. The historical 
increase in real share prices have only been a consequence of the returns to retained earnings. 
 The practical implications of the findings in this paper are 1) that the bias-corrected 
excess returns to equity are still in excess of the premium that is predicted by standard consumer 
theory; and 2) that historical equity returns are bad proxies for the excess returns on shares that 
investors can expect in the future. The finding in this paper of a bias-corrected equity premium of 
slightly less than 4% is still well in excess of the predictions of standard consumer theory and, 
therefore, still makes research in explaining the equity premium puzzle a worthwhile exercise.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Accumulated share index. The data are updated from 1970 using Morgan Stanley’s accumulated 
index. The following sources are used before 1970. Canada. 1900-1924: Dimson, Elroy, Paul Marsh 
and Mike Staunton, 2000, The Millennium Book, A Century of Investment Returns, London 
Business School, ABN, AMRO, 1924-99: Panjer, Harry H and K P Sharpe, 2001, “Report on 
Economic Statistics 1924-1998,” Canadian Institute of Actuaries. USA. Jack W Wilson and Charles 
P Jones, 2002, “An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles' Extensions: Price Indexes and 
Stock Returns, 1870-1999,” Journal of Business, 75, 505-533. Japan. Global Financial Data. 
Australia. Global Financial Data. France. 1870-1900: NBER Macroeconomic Data Base, 1900-
1970. Global Financial Data. Germany. Gregor Gielen, 1994, Konnen Aktienkurse Noch Steigen?, 
Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag. The index is multiplied by 10 before 1948 to take account of the money 
reform that changed the old Reismark to a new DEM at the ratio of 1:10. Ireland. S F Whelan, 
1999, From Canals to Computers: The Friends First Guide to Long Term Investment. Dublin: 
Friends First. Italy. Panetta, Fabio and Robert Violi, 1999, “Is there an Equity Premium Puzzle in 
Italy? A look at Asset Returns, Consumption and Financial Structure Data over the Last Century,” 
Termi di Discussione 353, Bank of Italy (data received by personal correspondence with Fabio 
Panetta). Netherlands. Eichholtz, Piet, Kees Koedijk and Roger Otten, 2000,”De Eeuw van Het 
Aandeel,” Economisch Statistische Berichten, January (data received by personal correspondence 
with Piet Eichholtz and Roger Otten). Spain. The data are kindly provided by Santiago Fernández 
Valbuena, Universidad Complutense. Madrid. United Kingdom. 1870-1913: Richard S Grossman, 
2002, “New Indices of British Equity Prices, 1870-1913,” Journal of Economic History, 62, 121-
146. 1913-1970. Barclays Capital, 2001, “Equity Guild Study,” Barclays Capital. Consumer 
Prices. B. R. Mitchell, 1983, International Historical Statistics: Americas and Australasia, 
Macmillan: London, B. R. Mitchell, 1975, European Historical Statistics 1750-1975, Macmillan: 
London, and B. R. Mitchell, 1982, International Historical Statistics: Asia and Africa, Macmillan: 
London. The data are updated using OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Nominal interest rates on 
short and long term government bonds. Canada. F. H. Leacy (ed.), 1983, Historical Statistics of 
Canada, Statistics Canada: Ottawa. USA. S. Homer and R. Sylla, 1991, A History of Interest Rates, 
London: Rudgers University Press. Corporate and municipal long-term bond yields are used over 
the period from 1900 to 1918. France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and UK. Homer and Sylla, op 
cit, where the official discount rate is used for Spain before 1940. Italy. Fratianni, M, Spinelli, F, 
1997, A Monetary History of Italy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ireland. Whelan, op 
cit. The data are updated using OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Oil Prices. The oil prices are 
converted into national currencies. Exchange Rates. 1913-46. I Svennilson, 1954, Growth and 
Stagnation in the European Economy, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, H. 
Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer, 1996, Historical Statistics of Switzerland, Chronos: Zurich, and Geneva 
and League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 1946-1950. United Nations, Monthly Bulletin 
of Economic Statistics. 1950-2002. IMF, International Financial Statistics. Spain. A Carreras, 
1989, Estadistieas Historicas de Espana, Madrid: Fundación Banco Exteriror. Italy, UK, France, 
Germany and Netherlands. N W Poathumus, 1946, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland, 
Leiden: Am. Canada. Department of Commerce, 1975, Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Colonial Times to 1970, Bureau of the Census: Washington DC. Ireland. Indexed using GBP over 
the period from 1870 to 1949. M1. Spain. Francisco Bustelo and Gabriel Tortella-Casares, 1976, 
“Monetary Inflation in Spain, 1800-1970,” Journal of European Economic History, 5, 141-150. 
UK. Forrest Capie and Alan Webber, 1985, A Monetary History of the United Kingdom, 1870-1982, 
Boston: George Allen & Unwin. Italy. M Fratianni and F Spinelli, 1997, A Monetary History of 
Italy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. USA. Historical Statistics, op cit. Canada, France, 
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Germany, and the Netherlands. The sum of deposits and notes and coins in circulation from 
Mitchell, op cit. The data are updated using IMF, International Financial Statistics. GDP at 
purchasing power parities. OECD, National Accounts, Vol. I. Real GDP. A. Maddison, 1995, 
Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992, Development Centre, OECD. 
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